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Introduction 
The story is told of a traveler in the west of Ireland. Thoroughly lost, he stopped beside a field and asked the farmhand working there how to get to 
Limerick. The answer was somewhat disconcerting: "Well, if I was you, sir, I 
wouldn't start from here!" There have been times over the last seven years when 
that phrase has come to mind. Decisions have been made and consequences have 
fo llowed-none more so perhaps than in the relationship between the "war on 
terror" and the law of armed conflict/laws of war. Much of this uncertainty arose 
out of the initial conflict in Afghanistan in 20CH. While it may not be possible to 
change the start point, it may help to look back and try to ascertain why we are 
where we are. Perhaps then, we will be in a better position to plan that route to 
Limerick. 
The End of the Beginning 
Our story has to start somewhere and where better than in the White H ouse and 
with a presidential decision. On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued his mem-
orandum on the subject of humane treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. l 
In paragraph 1, he stated: 
• Visiting Professor, King's CoUege London; Associate FeUow, Chatham House; and Visiting 
FeUow, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex. 
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Our recent extensive discussions regarding the status of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees 
confirm that the application of Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, (Geneva) to the conflict with al Qaeda and the 
Taliban involves complex legal questions. By its terms, Geneva applies to conflicts 
involving "High Contracting Parties," which can only be states. Moreover, it assumes 
the existence of "regular" armed forces fighting on behalf of states. However, the war 
against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, 
international reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the 
direct support of states. Our nation recognizes that this new paradigm - ushered in not 
by us, but by terrorists - requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that 
should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of Geneva. 
Although this memorandum was not released to the public until some time 
later, its effect upon the debates on both the classification of conflicts and theappli-
cation of the laws of war has been immense. No study of Afghanistan, or of any 
other conflict since 2002 in which the United States has been involved, can take 
place without considering the effect of this memorandum. Indeed so pivotal has it 
become to many of the arguments that now rage over the US position on law of war 
issues that it should be read in full: 
SUBJECf: Humane Treatment ofTaliban and al Qaeda Detainees 
1. Our recent extensive discussions regarding the status of al Qaeda and Taliban 
detainees confirm that the application of Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, (Geneva) to the conflict with al 
Qaeda and the Taliban involves complex legal questions. By its terms, Geneva applies 
to conflicts involving "High Contracting Parties," which can only be states. Moreover, 
it assumes the existence of "regular" armed forces fi ghting on behalf of states. 
However, the war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups 
with broad, international reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, 
sometimes with the direct support of states. Our nation recognizes that this new 
paradigm - ushered in not by us, but by terrorists - requires new thinking in the law 
of war, but thinking that should nevertheless be consistent with the principles of 
Geneva. 
2. Pursuant to my authority as commander in chief and chief executive of the 
United States, and relying on the opinion of the Department of Justice dated January 
22, 2002, and on the legal opinion rendered by the attorney general in his letter of 
February I, 2002, I hereby determine as follows: 
a. I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that 
none of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan 
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or elsewhere throughout the world because, among other reasons, al Qaeda is not a 
High Contracting Party to Geneva. 
b. I accept the legal conclusion of the attorney general and the Department of 
Justice that I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as 
between the United States and Afghanistan, but I decline to exercise that authority at 
this time. Accordingly, I determine that the provisions of Geneva will apply to our 
present conflict with the Taliban. I reserve the right to exercise the authority in this or 
futu re conflicts. 
c. I also accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that 
common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, 
because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and 
common Article 3 applies only to "armed conflict not of an international character." 
d. Based on the facts supplied by the Department of Defense and the 
recommendation of the Department of Justice, I determine that the Taliban 
detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not qualify as prisoners of war 
under Article 4 of Geneva. I note that, because Geneva does not apply to our conflict 
with al Qaeda, al Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war. 
3. Of course, our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations in the 
world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally 
entitled to such treatment. Our Nation has been and will continue to be a strong 
supporter of Geneva and its principles. A5 a matter of policy, the United States 
Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent 
appropriate and consistent with military necessity. in a manner consistent with the 
principles of Geneva. 
4. The United States will hold states, organizations, and individuals who gain 
control of United States personnel responsible for treating such personnel humanely 
and consistent with applicable law. 
5. I hereby reaffirm the order previously issued by the Secretary of Defense to the 
United States Armed Forces requiring that the detainees be treated humanely and, to 
the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent 
with the principles of Geneva. 
6. I hereby di rect the Secretary of State to communicate my determinations in an 
appropriate manner to our allies, and other countries and international 
organizations cooperating in the war against terrorism of global reach. 
/s/ George w. Bush2 
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Learned treatises have been written 0 0 almost every part of this memorandum, 
in particular on the issue of the application of what the President refers to as 
"Geneva" law. However, for the purposes of this article, it is necessary to go back 
beyond the application of the law to the facts. It is the issue of classification of the 
conflict itself that raises challenges to the existing legal framework. Was the situa-
tion in Afghanistan, and also in the wider context of world wide terrorism emanat-
ing in part at least from that country, a "new paradigm," removing it from the 
framework of law that had been painstakingly constructed over the previous 150 
years? Or was it a mutation of an existing structure and well capable of accommo-
dation within the current framework? 
In order to attempt to answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the cur-
rent framewo rk and also to examine the legal debate that raged within the Bush ad-
ministration. This memorandum was not the product of a "Eureka moment" in 
the Oval Office but the result of a need for a decision by the President following 
conflicting legal advice from within the administration itself. As with the memo-
randum itself, much of the debate revolves around classified material, in terms 
both of evidence and of the written advice itself. There have been leaks and much of 
the advice given, in particular by the Department of Justice, is now in the public 
domain. Greenberg and Drate1 have sought to bring these together in their compi-
lation The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib.3 At a later date, some of the 
State Department advice also came into the public domain. However, it is clear that 
the full picture remains locked in the corridors of power and it is unlike1y that it 
will emerge for some time to come. In the meantime, scholars and others must 
make do with what we have. 
The History 
The factual history is comparatively straightforward. O n September 11, 2001, ter-
rorists hijacked four airliners in US airspace and used them as missiles to attack tar-
gets in New York (the World Trade Center) and Washington (the Pentagon). One 
airliner was brought down short ofi ts target when passengers fought to regain con-
trol of the aircraft. Within days, it was apparent that these attacks were instigated 
byal Qaeda, operating primarily out of Afghanistan. Afghanistan at the time was a 
lawless State. Its location had made it a battleground for the power struggles be-
tween the British Empire and Russia in the nineteenth century. Although never 
fully colonized, it had not regained full independence until after the First World 
War, in 19 19, but even then its history was not a happy one. Since 1973, there had 
been a series of bloody coups, culminating in a Soviet invasion after Mohammed 
Daoud was m urdered in 1978 . The Soviet forces were themselves forced to 
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withdraw in 1989 and in 1996 the Taliban movement claimed control of the coun-
try and imposed a rigid Shari'a regime. Despite having territorial control of most of 
the country, the Taliban regime was not recognized by the vast majority of the na-
tions of the world and the "officially recognized" government was the Northern Al-
liance, which remained in control of a small enclave in the north of the country. 
The Taliban had provided support, refuge and facilities for the al Qaeda network, 
whose leader, Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi national, had been driven out of previous 
sanctuaries, induding Sudan. 
On October 7, 2001, following advice on his authority under the US Constitu-
tion to conduct military operations "against terrorists and nations supporting 
them"4 President Bush, in conjunction with other allies, launched military attacks 
against both al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan. In the letter sent by the 
Representative of the United States of America, John Negroponte, to the President 
of the Security Council, the United States invoked "its inherent right of individual 
and collective self-defense following armed attacks that were carried out against 
the United States on September 11, 2001."5 After describing the background to the 
9/11 attacks, the letter went on to say: 
The attacks on September 11, 2001, and the ongoing threat to the United States and its 
nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organization have been made possible by the decision 
of the Taliban regime to allow parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this 
organization as a base of operation. Despite every effort by the United States and the 
international community, the Taliban regime has refused to change its policy. From 
the territory of Afghanistan, the Al-Qaeda organization continues to train and support 
agents of terror who attack innocent people throughout the world and target United 
States nationals and interests in the United States and abroad.6 
While this made clear the connection drawn by the administration between al 
Qaeda and the Taliban, the letter also contained a slightly more ominous phrase: 
"We may find that our self-defense requires further actions with respect to other 
organizations and other States."7 
The "war on terror" had begun. 
The Laws of War 
The history of the laws of war had developed in treaty terms since the middle part 
of the nineteenth century. The laws had developed amid the Westphalian struc-
ture, where States were the principal subject of international law . International law 
governed relations between States and did not generally concern itself with activi-
ties within States, which were reserved to the jurisdiction of the States themselves. 
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War was an activity conducted between States and, as a result, the laws of war only 
applied to such wars. 
That does not mean that there was nothing that happened that today would be 
classifi ed as "terrorism." However, much of this was inevitably internal and thus 
considered beyond the boundaries of intemationallaw. Occasionally such matters 
spread across borders and indeed one of the best-known principles in international 
law, that of self-defense in the ius ad bellum, the Caroline case, arose out of cross-
border raids by irregulars. This led to the famous exchange of correspondence be-
tween Lord Ashburton, representing the United Kingdom, and the Secretary of 
War for the United States. Daniel Webster.6 It is perhaps interesting that one of the 
lesser-known parts of that particular incident was the fate of one Alexander 
Mcleod, who was arrested and detained by the US authorities for his alleged par-
ticipation in the destruction of the Caroline. He was tried, and acquitted, in New 
York and indeed it was his detention that led to the exchange of diplomatic 
correspondence. 
As a matter of practice. terrorism had normally been considered a matter oflaw 
enforcement-at times extraterritorial. It was dealt with by domestic law rather 
than international law and certainly not by the laws of war. 
In 1949, the text of the four Geneva Conventions of that year9 extended the laws 
of war beyond the traditional inter-State conflict. Conflicts were divided into two 
types. The firs t were described in Common Article 2 as follows: 
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which 
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war 
is not recognized by one of them. 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the 
territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed 
resistance. 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, 
the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. 
Theyshall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the 
latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof.1O 
This requires an "armed conflict" between "two or more High Contracting 
Parties." As only States can be High Contracting Parties. this means inter-State 




In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to 
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities. including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ~ hors de combat" by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction foun ded on race, colour, religion or faith, 
sex, birth or wealth. or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any 
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of 
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties 
to the conflict. II 
The key dements governing the application of this particular "mini-convention" 
are as follows: ( I) "an anned conflict," (2) "not of an international character" and 
(3) "occurring in the terri tory of one of the High Contracting Parties." Clearly this 
excluded any armed conflict that fell within the confines of Common Article 2, a 
conflict between two or more High Contracting Parties. However, the term 
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"armed conflict" remained undefined and it was unclear as to the status of a con-
fli ct primarily "occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties" 
when it crossed over international borders. It should be noted that the original in-
tention of the International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC) was that the 
whole of the Conventions shou1d apply to non-international armed conflicts. 
Common Article 3 therefore was an irreducible minimwn so far as it was con-
cerned. Attempts were indeed made to define what was meant by "armed conflict" 
but these were abandoned and it was the view of the JCRC that this "wise" decision 
meant that the term should be interpreted "as widely as possible."12 This meant 
avoiding the application of any threshold test. 
Similarly, although the geographic restriction was designed to catch civil wars, 
there does not appear to have been any intention to exclude conflicts with cross-
border elements. Few conflicts are contained entirely within the boundaries of one 
territory and it has generally been considered sufficient if the conflict is centered 
within the territory of a High Contracting Party, even ifit does have certain cross-
border fea tures. Many rebel groups operate from "safe havens" on the other side of 
international borders. Those who argued consistently that Northern Ireland 
amounted to a Common Article 3 conflict during the "Troubles" of the late twenti-
eth century would hardly have been amused to be told that the fact that elements of 
the Irish Republican Army operated from across the border in the Irish Republic 
excluded the application of Common Article 3. 
However, regardless of these argwnents, what was clear was the division of con-
fli ct into two separate categories. This division was confirmed by the adoption of 
the two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions in 1977. The first 
applied primarily to international armed conflicts as defined by Common Article 
213 and the second to non-international armed conflicts.l~ However, Additional 
Protocol II adopted a m uch more restricted field of application and also intro-
duced a threshold-a negative definition of what does not amount to an armed 
conflict. Article 1 reads: 
I. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of 
application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article I of the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which 
take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its anned forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
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2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, 
as not being armed conflicts. 
The higher threshold rules out a number oflow-intensity conflicts where terri-
tOI)' is not held by the dissident armed forces and. equally importantly, where the 
conflict is between dissident armed groups themselves without any involvement of 
the national forces. if they exist. Thus "failed State" conflicts where the battles are 
between rival warlords would normally be excluded from the application of Addi-
tional Protocol II. However, that does not mean that Common Article 3 does not 
apply. 
For our purposes, it is the lower threshold that is important. "[ S] ituations of in-
ternal disturbances and tensions. such as riots. isolated and sporadic acts of vio-
lence and other acts of a similar nature" are excluded "as not being armed 
conflicts." Terrorism was generally deemed to fit within this exclusion. This is il-
lustrated by the statement made by the United Kingdom on ratification of Addi-
tional Protocol I in 1998. It read: "It is the understanding of the United Kingdom 
that the term 'armed conflict' of itself and in its context denotes a situation of a 
kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts 
of terrorism whether cotlcerted or in isolatiotl"15 (emphasis added). This statement 
came fro m a nation that had been plagued by cross-border terrorism for a 
generation. 
Back to the Future 
The events of9/11 undoubtedly caused a rift within the Bush administrat ion. The 
language was all of "war" but what was not clear was whether this was seen as politi-
cal rhetoric or legal analysis. The sheer scale of the atrocity undoubtedly contrib-
uted to this, but war against whom? The term "war on terrorism" cannot be taken 
as a legal description. "Terrorism" is a tactic and one cannot wage war against a tac-
tic in any meaningfu1legal sense. The planning obviously focused on Afghanistan, 
where Osama Bin Laden was based, and the United States, with support from many 
parts of the world, prepared for war in Afghanistan. 
It seems that. at this point, there was growing confusion between US constitu-
tionallaw and international law. This may be because of the trend for both to be 
taught together in universities in the United States. On September 25. 200 1. lohn 
Yoo wrote the memorandwn opinion to Timothy Flanagan. Deputy Counsel to 
the President , already mentioned. 16 In that memorandum. which runs to some 
twenty pages. there is only one reference in the main text to international law. 17 
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That reference is in relation to declarations of war. It states: "Instead of serving as 
an authorization to begin hostilities, a declaration of war was only necessary to 
'perfect' a conflict under international law." 
Apart from that isolated instance, the whole of the remainder of the memoran-
dum deals with the position under US constitutional law. There is, however, one 
sentence which possibly sums up the change of opinion in the United States and 
also shows that such a change predates the presidency of George w. Bush. This sen-
tence refers to the address to the nation delivered by President Clinton on August 20, 
1998 in relation to the strike which he had ordered that day on Afghanistan and Su-
dan following the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The sen-
tence reads: "Furthermore, in explaining why military action was necessary, the 
President noted that 'law enforcement and diplomatic tools' to combat terrorism 
had proved insufficient, and that 'when our very national security is challenged .. . 
we must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens."'18 Thus, it 
appears that, as early as 1998 under President Clinton, the United States was begin-
ning to move away from treating terrorism as solely a matter of law enforcement . 
The "war on terror" had not arrived but the initial skirmishes were under way. 
Hostilities 
The legal debate took a backseat during the conduct of hostilities. While there was 
some discussion over the ius ad bellum issues, the campaign was conducted in ac-
cordance with the principles of the law of armed conflict. Regardless of whether 
there was one conflict or two, the Department of Defense directive provides that 
the armed forces should "comply with the law of war during all armed confli cts, 
however such conflicts are characterized, and with the principles and spirit of the 
law of war during all other operations. "19 
However, the issue became live again when prisoners began to be captured. 
Were they prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention or were they not? 
Was there any distinction to be made between al Qaeda and the Taliban? If so, what 
was it and what were the legal grounds for making any distinction? 
The Debate Continues 
As has been mentioned earlier, not all the relevant docwnentation is in the public 
domain and therefore the discussion must inevitably be tentative. However, a 
number of documents have either been released or leaked and these in themselves 
make very interesting reading and go some way to explaining the decision made by 
President Bush on February 7, 2002. 
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On January 9, John Yoo circulated a draft memorandum prepared by him and 
Special Counsel Robert Delahunty addressed to the General Counsel of the De-
partment of Defense, William J. Haynes.2o This memorandum , significantly, was 
based on the War Crimes Act, a domestic statute.2l It sought to argue two main 
propositions: ( I) "[NJeither the Geneva Conventions nor the [War Crimes Act ] 
regulate the detention of al Qaeda prisoners captured during the Afghanistan con-
fli ct" and (2) the Geneva Conventions did not apply to "captured members of the 
Taliban militia."22 The simple argument was that neither al Qaeda nor Taliban 
fighters were entitled to prisoner of war status. Put in those terms, the statement, 
while controversial, would have fitted within the traditional law of war concept. 
However, it was not so much the propositions themselves but the arguments put 
forward to support them that were to cause controversy. 
First, starting from the War Crimes Act, Yooand Delahuntybegan to examine the 
nature of conflict. They drew the usual distinction between Common Articles 2 and 
3 to the Geneva Conventions b ut sought to narrow the application of Common Ar-
ticle 3, stating it "should not be read to include all forms of non-international 
armed confli ct."23 Their argument was that, "in enacting the [War Crimes Act], 
Congress did not understand the scope of Common Article 3 to extend beyond civil 
wars to all other types of internal armed conflict."24 In their view Common Article 3 
only applied to "large-scale con flicts between a State and an insurgent group,"2S a 
similar threshold to that later incorporated into Additional Protocol 11.26 
Second, they argued that "AI Qaeda's status as a non-State actor renders it ineli-
gible to claim the protections of the treaties specified by the [War Crimes Act ]. "27 
The argumentation is confused as it is not made explicit whether the reason for 
this conclusion is the nature of al Qaeda or the nature of the conflict itself. There 
are elements of both arguments and certainly when discussing Common Articles 2 
and 3, the memorandum states, "Our conflict with al Qaeda does not fit into ei-
ther category."28 
Yoo and Delahunty then move to the "Taliban militia." They argue that, as a 
matter of constitutional law, "the Executive has the plenary authority to determine 
that Afghanistan ceased at relevant times to be an operating State and therefore 
that members of the Taliban militia were and are not protected by the Geneva Con-
ventions. "29 There follows detailed argument as to why Afghanistan was a "failed 
State" and a conclusion that "Afghanistan under the Taliban militia was in a condi-
tion of 'statelessness,' and therefore was not a High Contracting Party to the 
Geneva Conventions for at least that period of time."30 
A secondary argument was that, even if the Geneva Conventions did apply to Af-
ghanistan, the members of the Taliban militia themselves did not fall within the cate-
gory of prisoner of war, outlined in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention}l 
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They argued that the Taliban "cannot even be considered 'a government or 
authority'" for the purposes of Article 4A(3), which covers "[m]embers of regular 
armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recog-
nized by the Detaining Power." It was accepted that the United States had never 
recognized the Taliban regime as the government of Afghanistan. n 
The memorandum continued with a review of previous US campaigns, arguing 
that wherever the Geneva Conventions had been applied-Korea, Vietnam, Pan-
ama, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia-a distinction needed to be drawn between their 
application as a matter of law and their application as a matter of policy.33 It goes 
on to discuss whether, even if the Geneva Conventions were prima facie applicable, 
the President had the power to suspend their application either in whole or in part 
in relation to Afghanistan. They concluded that as a matter of constitutional law 
"the President may regard a treaty as suspended for several reasons."34 They then 
justified such a course essentially on the basis that "Afghanistan under the Taliban 
could be held to have violated basic humanitarian duties under the Geneva Con-
ventions and other norms of internationallaw."35 They agreed that there was no 
precedent for such a suspension by the United States but pointed out that after 
both the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War, the United States had deviated 
from the strict terms of the Convention by allowing voluntary repatriation of pris-
oners of war rather than the mandatory repatriation required by the letter of the 
law in Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention.36 
The position under international law was also considered but with a telling 
introduction: 
We emphasize that the resolution of that question [whether the Geneva Conventions 
were applicable], however, has,1O bearing on domestic constitutional issues, or on the 
application of the [War Crimes Actl. Rather, these issues are worth consideration as a 
means of justifying the actions of the United States in the world of international 
politics. J7 
Their conclusion was that "it appears to be permissible, as a matter of both treaty 
law and of customary international law, to suspend performance of Geneva Con-
vention obligations on a temporary basis."38 The reference to customary interna-
tionallaw was necessary as the United States is not party to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties39 though, somewhat reluctantly, the memorandum ac-
cepted that "some lower courts have said that the Convention embodies the cus-
tomary international law of treaties, and the State Department has at various times 
taken the same view."40 
168 
Charles Garraway 
The memorandum concludes with a general examination of customary interna-
tionallaw. It comes to the firm conclusion that it does not amount to federal law, 
citing Chief Justice Marshall, who described customary international law as "a 
guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will. The rule, like other pre-
cepts of morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is addressed to the judgment 
of the sovereign; and although it cannot be disregarded by him without obloquy, 
yet it may be disregarded."·t However, somewhat unusually, the authors went on 
to hold that "the President can properly find the unprecedented conflict between 
the United States and transnational terrorist organizations a 'war' for the purposes 
of the customary or common laws of war. ".2 The purpose of this, however, was to 
subject al Qaeda and the Taliban to those laws rather than US forces to them. This 
is one of the few examples of the wider conflict against "transnational terrorist 
organizations" being mentioned. 
The final paragraph swns up the whole memorandum. It states: 
[WJe conclude that neither the federal War Crimes Act nor the Geneva Conventions 
would apply to the detention conditions in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or to trial by 
military commission of al Qaeda or Taliban prisoners. We also conclude that 
customary intemationallaw has no legal binding effect on either the President or the 
military because it is not federal law, as recognized by the Constitution. Nonetheless, 
we also believe that the President as Commander-in-Chief, has the constitutional 
authority to impose the customary laws of war on both the aI Qaeda and Taliban 
groups and the U.S. Armed Forces.·3 
It should be noted again that the main subject of this memorandum is detention 
conditions and the role of the military commissions. As such, the nature of the con-
flict or conflicts in themselves is a secondary consideration other than as it impacts 
on the main issue. There is thus no argument specifically on the issue of whether 
the conflict within Afghanistan itself was a single conflict governed by the laws re-
lating to international armed conflict or whether it was bifurcated into a war 
against al Qaeda and a war against the Taliban. Indeed, the main purpose of the 
memorandum seems to be to argue that the laws relating to armed conflict did not 
apply at all! 
The State Department Response 
The draft memorandum had been copied to, inler alia, the State Department and 
brought a swift response from William H. Taft IV, the Legal Adviser. In a covering 
note to his memorandum in response to the YoolDelahunty draft, he said that he 
found "the most important factual assumptions on which your draft is based and 
169 
Afghanistan and the Nature ofCon[1ict 
its legal analysis are seriously flawed."'" Again, the main purpose of the response 
was to examine the issues relating to detention rather than the nature of the con-
flict. The comments were grouped into four sections. The first dealt with the con-
tinuing applicabili ty of treaty relations and made the point that " the ability, 
inability or even unwillingness of a State to perform international treaty obliga-
tions is a question entirely separate from the question of its status. Afghanistan has 
continued to be a State and a party to the Geneva Conventions during the relevant 
period."45 There followed detailed legal and factual argument including a specific 
reference to United Nations practice: 
The UN SecurityCouncil [UNSC] has also indicated that the Taliban and other parties 
to the Afghan conflict were bound to comply with the Geneva Conventions. In UNSC 
Resolution 1193(1998), the Security Council reaffirmed that: All parties to the conflict 
[in Afghanistan] are bound to comply with their obligations under international 
humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ... . 
UNSC Resolution 1214, also concerning the contlict in Afghanistan, uses essen-
tially the same language in a preambular clause. The parties referred to in these in-
stances are the Taliban and those forces fighting against the Taliban. These 
Resolutions, in which the United States joined the consensus, describe "obliga-
tions" to adhere to the Geneva Conventions. The Security Council could not have 
issued a resolution containing such a clause ifit had not been convinced that there 
was a proper legal basis to apply international law obligations to the parties to the 
conflict within Afghanistan. Evidently, the Council-and the United States----<iid 
not believe that Afghanistan was a "failed State" where the Geneva Conventions 
had become inapplicable. 
The second section addresses application of the Geneva Conventions and states: 
"This section concludes that the [Third Geneva Convention ] applies because the 
situation as between the United States and the Taliban is one of an armed conflict 
arising between two or more High Contracting Parties under Article 2."46 It should 
be noted that this refers solely to "the situation as between the United States and 
the Taliban." 
The section makes clear that, in the view of the State Department, Common Ar-
ticle 2 to the Geneva Conventions applied and that Afghanistan "remained a High 
Contracting Party by virtue of accepted principles of international law."47 In its 
opinion, "the United States' refusal to recognize the Taliban as the government was 
not a conclusion that the Taliban was not in effective control of the great part of Af-
ghanistan territory."48 The State Department also resisted the Justice Department 
argument that the Taliban and al Qaeda Were indistinguishable. 
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The memorandum then examined whether, on the basis that the Geneva Con-
ventions applied, the Taliban still qualified under Article 4A of the Third Geneva 
Convention as prisoners of war. The conclusion was reached that, prima facie, they 
qualified as "regular armed forces" under Article 4A(3) but that in cases of doubt, 
the appropriate course would be to hold tribunals under Article 5 of the Third 
Geneva Convention.49 In this section, there is a very interesting footnote, which 
reads: 
For instance, one reason among many that the AI Qaeda forces may not be entitled to 
POW status is that their operations are designed to violate the laws of war - most 
particularly, to target and attack civilian populations as such, civilians and civilian 
property. It is this kind of systematic violation which excludes organized forces from 
Article 4(A )(3).so 
This does not rule out judging al Qaeda by the standards of the Geneva Conven-
tions but in order to do so, they would have to be applicable. 
The section concludes by taking issue with some of the conclusions drawn in the 
Justice Department memorandum on US practice in previous military campaigns 
before taking further issue with the Justice Department position on the possibility 
of suspending obligations under the Geneva Conventions. As the State Depart-
ment pointed out, the United States had not sought to invoke any breach at the 
time as grounds for suspension and it was somewhat late now. 
The final section examined the position under customary international law and 
pointed out one basic tenet: 
Were the President, as contemplated by the Draft Opinion, to act lawfully under 
federal law in a manner that would be inconsistent with the obligations of the United 
States under customary international law, that action would, notwithstanding its 
lawfulness under U.S. domestic law, constitute a breach of an international legal 
obligation of the United States.SI 
The memorandum pointed out how often the United States invokes customary 
law in its relations with other States, outlining, somewhat mischievously, that "the 
United States relies upon customary international law to provide the President and 
his family with immunity from prosecution and legal process when he travels 
abroad, by virtue of the doctrine of head of State immunity, which is entirely a mat-
ter of customary internationallaw."$2 
The memorandum concludes with an annex on possible consequences if the 
Bush administration were to decide against the application of the Geneva 
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Conventions, both in domestic and international fora . It is a clear warning that 
any such action would not be without consequences. 
As will be seen, the Taft memorandum bases itself on refuting the specific legal 
arguments put forward by the Justice Department. It does not deal with the classifi -
cation of the conflict except when it is directly relevant to the subject matter. There 
is nothing in the memorandum that indicates that the author takes the view that 
there is a bifurcated conflict in Afghanistan rather than a single conflict that covers 
all the various participants. Such indications as there are tend toward the "single 
conflict" point of view though it may be that the author never considered that par-
ticular point as an issue. 
The Justice Riposte 
There followed a strong response from John Yoo and Robert Delahunty in which 
they effectively maintained their previous position.53 Interestingly, they com-
mented, "Although we have similar bottom lines, we differ in reasoning on the way 
there. "54 Indeed the argument was not so much on the practical effect of any deci-
sion on whether or not al Qaeda or the Taliban should be granted prisoner of war 
status, but more on the legal reasoning that led to any such decision . The discus-
sion on the conflict itself was limited though they did refer to "the unprecedented 
nature of our war with al Qaeda and the Taliban,"ss the singular being important 
here. The result was a new version of the Y oo/Deiahunty memorandum, issued on 
January 22, 2002.56 
However, there had been a development in that, on January 18, the President, 
acting as Commander in Chief, had directed that al Qaeda and Taliban individuals 
under the control of the Department of Defense were not entitled to prisoner of 
war status. This was communicated by a memorandum to the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Secretary of DefenseY 
Although the Yoo/Delahunty memorandum had been restructured, there was 
little change to the main arguments. There was reference to "a conflict with al 
Qaeda," stating that it " is not properly included in non -international forms of 
armed conllict"S8 and later that it "does not fall within Article 2" of the Geneva 
Conventions.59 "It is not an international war betw"een nation-States because al 
Qaeda is not a State. Nor is this conflict a civil war under Article 3 because it is a 
conflict of ean international character.'''6(1 This last quote is in a section dealing with 
the application of the War Crimes Act and associated treaties to al Qaeda. 
When the memorandum turns to discussing the application of the Geneva Con-
ventions to the Taliban militia, it refers to "the present conflict with respect to the 
Taliban militia."61 Later on, in discussing the possible suspension of the Geneva 
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Conventions, the authors talk of the suspension of the Conventions "as applied to 
the Taliban militia in the current war in Afghanistan. "62 Later still, when discussing 
the possible status ofTaliban prisoners under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Con-
vention, there is reference to the need, if the Geneva Conventions are to apply, for 
" the Afghanistan conflict" to be qualified as an international armed conflict.63 This 
is followed up with a telling sentence: "At this point in time, we cannot predict 
what consequences this acceptance of jurisdiction would have for future stages in 
the war on terrorism."64 
An overall study of the memorandum leaves the reader with a sense that, as a re-
sult of the confused debate on the application of the law, the issue of whether Af-
ghanistan was one conflict or two was not really considered. At some stages, there is 
indeed reference to "a conflict with al Qaed.a" but in others there seems to be an in-
dication that the conflict in Afghanistan was homogeneous though the application 
of the law might differ in respect to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. Part of this 
confusion seems to arise from the uncertainty as to whether al Qaeda was a party to 
the conflict (which seems to be the view taken) or whether it was merely a partici-
pant in a conflict. The issue of how many conflicts were coexisting was not directly 
addressed. 
The Final Arguments 
The Justice Department riposte led to a strong response from the State Depart-
ment. On January 23, William Taft wrote to Judge Gonzales, Counsel to the Presi-
dent, attaching a further memorandum which he had sent that day to John YoO.65 
This in fact referred to a second draft of the original Yoo/Delahunty memorandum 
though it actually followed the dispatch of the final version. In it, Taft made his po-
sition clear. He stated: 
As you know from our previous comments, our view is that, as a matter of 
international law, the Third Geneva Convention applies to the armed conflict in 
Afghanistan because it "arises between" two High Contracting Parties to the 
Convention under common Article 2. The legal status of both al Qaeda and Taliban 
detainees must therefore be assessed under the Third Convention.66 
This is as close as it is possible to get to a clear statement that Afghanistan was a sin-
gle conflict and could not be bifurcated between al Qaeda and the Taliban. He then 
went on to deal with the application of that Convention, confirming that al Qaeda 
members were not entitled to prisoner of war status, though invoking Common 
Article 3 as providing "minimal standards applicable in any armed conflict. "67 
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On January 25, 2002, Judge Gonzales prepared a draft memorandum for the 
President entitled "Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Pris-
oners of War to the Conflict with AI Qaeda and the Taliban."68 The title itself is in-
teresting as, though the memorandum allies itself almost entirely with the 
positions being taken by the Justice Department-and indeed affirms that its in-
terpretation on legal issues of this sort is "definitive" -the heading refers to "the 
[c[onflict with AI Qaeda and the Taliban." This use of the singular seems to con-
firm that the issue of bifurcation simply was not considered. 
The draft memorandum brought a swift response from the Secretary of State, 
Colin Powell, who himself wrote to Judge Gonzales.69 In this he said: 
I hope that the final memorandum will make clear that the President's choice is 
bctw~n 
Option I: Determine that the Geneva Convention on the treatment of Prisoners of 
War (GPW) does not apply to the conflict on "failed State" or some other grounds. 
Announce this position publicly. Treat all detainees consistent with the principles of 
the GPW; 
md 
Option 2: Determine that the Geneva Convention does apply to the conflict in 
Afghanistan, but that members of aI Qaeda as a group and the Taliban individually or as 
a group are not entitled to Prisoner of War status under the Convention. Announce 
this position publicly. Treat all detainees consistent with the principles of the GPW.70 
There followed three pages of argument, as well as a page of comment on the Gonzales 
draft memorandum, but it seems dear that, in the view of the Secretary of State, 
there was only one conflict and the debate was only as to how al Qaeda and the 
Taliban should be treated within whatever legal regime was deemed to apply to that 
conflict. If the Secretary of State had considered that there was an issue as to 
whether the "conflict in Afghanistan" was one or bifurcated, it might be reasonable 
to expect that there would be some argument on the point in his letter. There is none. 
The intervention of the Secretary of State brought a riposte from the Attorney 
General, John Ashcroft, on February 1, 2002.71 In his letter to the President, he ar-
gues strongly for Option 1, stating that " this will provide the United States with the 
highest level oflegal certainty available under American law. "72 At no point does he 
take issue with the statement by the Secretary of State that the conflict is singular. 
The purpose of his letter is made d ear when he states: 
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[AJ Presidential determination against treaty applicability would provide the highest 
assurance that no court would subsequently entertain charges that American military 
officers, intelligence officials. or law enforcement officials violated Geneva Convention 
rules relating to field conduct, detention conduct or interrogation of detainees. The 
War Crimes Act of 1996 makes violation of parts of the Geneva Convention a crime in 
the United States.73 
William Taft, in a memorandum dated February 2, 2002,74 made one last despair-
ing effort to repair what he apparen tly saw as an obvious departure by the United 
States from its traditional stance on the laws of war. He began by saying: "The pa-
per should make clear that the issue for decision by the President is whether the 
Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict in Afghanistan in which U.S. armed 
forces are engaged."7S After arguing forcefully for the application of the Conven-
tions, he continued tellingly: "1t is not inconsistent with the 001 [Department of 
Justice J opinion that the Conventions generally do not apply to our world-wide ef-
fort to combat terrorism and to bring al Qaeda members to justice."76 He con-
cluded by saying: 
The structure of the paper suggesting a distinction between our conflict with aI Qaeda 
and our conflict with the Taliban does not conform to the structure of the 
Conventions. The Conventions call for a decision whether they apply to the conflict in 
Afghanistan. If they do, their provisions are applicable to all persons involved in that 
conflict - aI Qaeda, Taliban, Northern Alliance, U.S. troops, civilians, etc. If the 
Conventions do not apply to the conflict, no one involved in it will enjoy the benefit of 
their protections as a maner of law.77 
This is the first occasion that any argument is given on this specific issue. Attached to 
that m emorandum are some notes entitled "Status of Legal Discussions."78 The 
notes clearly state that: 
• DOJ lawyers have concluded as maner of law that our conflict with al Qaeda, 
regardlessofwhere it is carried out, is not covered by GPW. Lawyers from DOD, WHC 
and OVP support that legal conclusion. 
• DOJ. 000, WHe, and OVP lawyers believe that this conclusion is desirable 
from a domestic law standpoint because it provides the best possible insulation 
from any misapplication of the War Crimes Act to the conflict with aI Qaeda, 
whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere. 
• DOJ. ooD. WHC, and OVP lawyers further believe that this conclusion is 
appropriate for policy reasons because it emphasizes that the worldwide conflict 
with aI Qaeda is a new sort of conflict, one not covered by GPW or some other 
traditional rules of warfare. 
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DOS lawyers believe that GPW applies to our treatment or aI Qaeda members 
captured in Afghanistan on the theory that GPW applies to the conflict in Afghanistan, 
not to particular individuals or groups. 
• DOS lawyers believe this conclusion is desirable from a domestic and 
international law standpoint because it provides the best legal basis for our 
intended treatment or the detainees and strengthens the Geneva Convention 
protections of our rorces in Afghanistan and other conflicts. 
• DOS lawyers further believe this conclusion is appropriate for policy reasons 
because it emphasizes that even in a new wrt or conflict the United States bases 
its conduct on its international treaty obligations and the rule oflaw, not just its 
policy prererences. 
At last, the issue was out in the open after being the "elephant in the room" for 
so long. Five days later, President Bush issued his memorandum79 and the die was 
cast. 
Conclusion 
Why was the matter not dealt with in detail in any of the earlier documentation? 
Surely, if the State Department had realized that it was a live issue, it would have 
featured in the earlier correspondence. For example, the Secretary of State's 
memorandum80 seems to have taken for granted that the conflict in Afghanistan 
was one entity and so, intriguingly, does the memorandum for the President, writ-
ten by Judge Gonzales on January 25.81 However, it was dearly an issue-indeed 
perhaps the key issue-by the time that William Taft wrote on February 2.62 
Was this a sudden realization by the State Department or did the issue crystallize 
in those few days at the end of January 2002? In any event, it would seem that one of 
the most fundamental rulings that President Bush made was the least subject to le-
gal discussion. A further irony is that it might not have been necessary. Had the 
President followed the advice of the State Department in respect to Afghanistan, 
the creation of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay would still have hap-
pened. Members of al Qaeda would still have been denied prisoner of war status 
and it is likely that the vast majority of Taliban detainees would have been in the 
same position. The argument would have been on a different issue-whether there 
is a gap between the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions where "unprivileged 
belligerents" are concerned. That is a case where the United States would have been 
on far stronger legal ground. Would it have had an effect on the worldwide effort to 
combat terrorism or would it have actually helped the United States in enabling it 
to lead the effort from the moral high ground? Unfortunately, we will never know. 
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Now we struggle to deal with the issues ca used by that fateful decision both in rela-
tion to Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world. We are still struggling to get to 
Limerick but we have no choice but to start from here. 
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